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JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann Sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1953). 
This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Utah Supreme Court by notice of the Clerk of the Utah Supreme 
Court dated December 22, 1988. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs 
J. Marius Nielson and Faye K. Nielson ("the Nielsons") and 
against Defendants Prowswood, Ltd. dba Prowswood Realtor 
("Prowswood") and Rita Luke ("Luke") entered after a bench 
trial before District Judge David S. Young. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
At issue on this appeal is an agreement to purchase real 
property which Luke, a real estate agent, signed, purportedly 
on behalf of Prowswood, her broker* The Nielsons later 
attempted to enforce the agreement against Prowswood. The 
following issues are presented: 
1. Without written authority, could Luke legally bind 
Prowswood to purchase real property? 
2. Where the Nielsons had no communications with 
Prowswood regarding Luke's authority, but relied exclusively 
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on Luke's own representations, did Luke have apparent 
authority to bind Prowswood? 
3. Where Prowswood lacked both knowledge of the pur-
chase agreement and an intent to ratify it, did Prowswood's 
acceptance of a commission under the Koch listing agreement 
ratify the Luke purchase agreement? 
4. Was evidence of Maurius Nielson's experience as a 
licensed real estate broker relevant and therefore 
admissible? 
5. Should the reasonable rental value of the property 
during the period of the Nielsons' occupancy offset the 
Nielsons' damage award? 
6. If the Nielsons' Judgment against Prowswood is 
-affirmed, is Prowswood entitled to judgment over against 
Luke? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Interpretation of the following statutes and rules is 
determinative of the first and fourth issues stated above: 
Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-1 (1953): 
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall 
be created . . . otherwise than by act or operation 
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating . . . the same, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. 
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Utah Code Ann. Section 25-5-3 (1953): 
Every contract for • . . the sale, of any lands, or 
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party by whom the . • . 
sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent there-
unto authorized in writing. 
RULE 402, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the 
United States or the Constitution of the state of 
Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature and Disposition. This is an action brought by 
the Nielsons seeking specific performance of an agreement to 
purchase a condominium entered into by Luke, a real estate 
agent, purportedly on behalf of Prowswood, her broker. The 
matter was tried before District Judge David S. Young, who 
granted judgment in favor of the Nielsons against Prowswood 
and Luke jointly and severally. 
Relevant Facts. The following facts of the case are 
relevant to the issues on review: 
1. At all material times, Luke was a licensed real 
estate agent of Prowswood under a contract entitled 
"Agreement of Independent Contractor" ("the Independent 
Contractor Agreement"). Trial Transcript, Vol 1, p. 156; 
Exhibit 15-D(a). 
2. Paragraph 9 of the Independent Contractor Agreement 
expressly withheld from Luke the authority "to incur any ex-
pense, enter any contract, or make any representation or 
commitment for and on behalf of [Prowswood] unless such 
authority is specifically given, in writing, with respect to 
each such transaction." Exhibit 15-D(a). 
3. Prowswood never authorized Luke in writing or 
otherwise to purchase real property on its behalf. Trial 
Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 206. 
4. The Nielsons were looking for a home to lease in 
Salt Lake City; Luke showed the Nielsons a condominium owned 
by Mr. and Mrs. Koch and listed with Prowswood ("the 
property"). Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 14-16. 
5. On or about November 19, 1985, the Nielsons 
executed an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase the 
property. On that same date, Luke, purportedly on behalf of 
Prowswood, executed an agreement with the Nielsons stating 
that if the Nielsons elected not to retain possession of the 
property prior to June 1, 1986, Prowswood would have 120 days 
to sell or "repurchase" the property at a price that would 
net the Nielsons $160,000, the full purchase price paid by 
them ("Luke Agreement" or "the Agreement"). Exhibits 1-P and 
2-P. 
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6. Prowswood granted Luke no authority, written or 
oral, to bind Prowswood to purchase the property. Trial 
Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 206. 
7. Luke knew that she lacked authority to bind 
Prowswood to purchase the property. Trial Transcript, Vol. 
2.9 P- 206. 
8. Prowswood has never had a guaranteed sales program 
with respect to properties not owned by Prowswood. Trial 
Transcript. Vol. 2. p. 15. 
9. Although Maurius Nielson was concerned as to 
whether Luke had authority to bind Prowswood, he made no 
inquiry of anyone at Prowswood, including his own son-in-law, 
as to whether she had such authority. Trial Transcript, Vol. 
-1, pp. 105-06. 
10. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Nielson ever testified that 
they relied upon any act or omission of Prowswood, or 
anything other than Luke's own representations, in determin-
ing whether she was authorized to bind Prowswood to the Luke 
Agreement. Trial Transcript. Vols. 1 & 2. 
11. Prior to the date of the Luke Agreement, Prowswood 
had no communication with the Nielsons regarding Luke's 
authority or its limits. Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 52-
53; 144. 
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12. Marius Nielsen is a licensed real estate broker in 
California and since 1962 has been a licensed real estate 
broker in Utah. Exhibit 12-D(a). 
13. Maurius Nielson was previously employed by a 
Prowswood subsidiary, Transwest Building Supply, as a vice 
president in charge of day-to-day operations; in that 
capacity, he had no authority to purchase real property. 
Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 142-43. 
14. Expert witness Wilburn McDougal testified that, 
although he was familiar with guaranteed sales programs, a 
guaranteed buy-back at 100% of the purchase price would be 
unusual. Trial Transcript, Vol. 1. pp. 132-33. 
15. Mr. McDougal further testified that, with respect 
bo his own company's guaranteed sales program, while some 
agents were at times authorized to sign a buy-back agreement, 
such authorizations were made on an individual basis. Trial 
Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 132. 
16. Upon the sale of the property to the Nielsons, 
Prowswood and Luke received sales commissions paid by the 
sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Koch. Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 
197; Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, p. 12, 16. 
17. Prowswood was unaware of the Luke Agreement at the 
time it accepted a commission from Mr. and Mrs. Koch on the 
sale of the property. Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, p. 12. 
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18. By letter dated May 10, 1986, the Nielsons demanded 
that Prowswood either resell or purchase the property within 
12 0 days pursuant to the Luke Agreement. The 12 0 days 
expired on September 10. 1986. Exhibit 3-P. 
19. By letter dated June 10, 1986, Prowswood notified 
the Nielsons that binding Prowswood to purchase the property 
"was far in excess" of Luke's authority as a sales agent. 
Exhibit 4-P. 
20. Also in that letter, Prowswood offered to list the 
property for sale and to waive its commission on the sale. 
Exhibit 4-P. 
21. The Nielsons occupied the property through trial. 
Trial Transcript. Vol. 1. p. 16. 
22. Gene C. Jorgensen further testified that the fair 
market rental value of the property was between $900.00 and 
$1,000.00 per month for each month during the period 1986 
through the date of trial. Trial Transcript, Vol. 2. p. 33. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Prowswood1s arguments may be summarized briefly as 
follows: 
1. Written Authority. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 25-5-1, -3, and -4 (1953), a contract to purchase 
real property is void unless the agent signing on behalf of a 
principal had written authority. Since Prowswood did not 
authorize Luke in writing to enter into an agreement to 
purchase real property, Prowswood is not bound by the Luke 
Agreement• 
2. Apparent Authority. For apparent authority to 
exist, the principal must cause the third party to reasonably 
believe that the agent is clothed with authority. The 
Nielsons did not infer Luke's authority from the acts or 
conduct of Prowswood; in fact, they received no communica-
tions from Prowswood relating to Luke's authority. They 
relied exclusively on Luke's own representations of her 
authority. Therefore, Luke lacked apparent authority and 
Prowswood is not bound by the Luke Agreement. 
3. Ratification. a. To ratify an act, a principal 
-must have knowledge of all material facts and an intent to 
ratify. Since Prowswood lacked both, it could not ratify the 
Luke Agreement. 
b. Where, as here, the original grant of authority must 
be in writing, its ratification must also be in writing. 
Since Prowswood's purported ratification was not written, it 
is void. c. A principal's acceptance of a benefit consti-
tutes an affirmance only where he has no claim to the benefit 
except through the act purportedly affirmed. Since Prowswood 
was entitled to its commission exclusively through the Koch 
listing agreement, accepting and retaining the commission did 
not ratify the Luke Agreement. 
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4. Admission of Evidence, The fact that Marius 
Nielson is a himself a licensed real estate broker is 
relevant to his knowledge of the authority of real estate 
agents and therefore increased his burden to ascertain Luke's 
authority. It should have been admitted. 
5. Rental Offset. The parties agreed that Prowswood 
was entitled to an offset for the fair rental value of the 
property for the 22 months between the alleged breach and 
trial. Fair rental value is between $900.00 and $lf000.00 
per month. It should have been awarded. 
6. Judgment Against Luke. Prowswood is entitled to 
judgment over against Luke for damages it suffered as a 
result of her clear breach of the Independent Contractor 
Agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORITY, LUKE WAS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
UNABLE TO BIND PROWSWOOD TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY 
It is undisputed that Luke did not have written author-
ity to enter into an agreement to purchase property on behalf 
of Prowswood. Yet without written authority, an agent cannot 
bind her principal to purchase real property. Utah Code Ann. 
Section 25-5-1 (1953) states in pertinent part: 
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No estate or interest in real property . . . shall 
be created • • . otherwise than by act or operation 
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating • . . the same, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. 
The Utah Supreme Court applied this provision in Cady v. 
Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), where it stated: 
Utah law is clear that only a written power of 
attorney will authorize one to bind another to a 
contract for the sale of real property. 
[Quotation of Section 25-5-1] 
In the instant case, there was no dispute as to the 
absence of the written power of attorney. There-
fore, no authorization was ever established. There 
being no authorization, there could be no contract; 
there being no contract, there could be no right to 
recover . . . 
Accord, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 25-5-3 (1953); Bradshaw v. 
McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78-79 (Utah 1982) ("an agent executing 
an agreement conveying an interest in land on behalf of his 
principal must be authorized in writing.") See also, Utah 
Code Ann. Section 25-5-4 (1953). 
For this Court to affirm the enforcement of an agreement 
to purchase real property against a principal without written 
authority would wreak havoc in the real estate industry in 
this state. It would effectively repeal the cornerstone of 
real estate law and open a Pandora's Box of uncertainty and 
litigation. 
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2. 
LUKE LACKED APPARENT AUTHORITY TO BIND PROWSWOOD 
The trial court found as a matter of fact and a matter 
of law that "Rita Luke had the apparent authority to bind 
Prowswood and execute the Agreement." Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 12. The trial court entered no other 
findings or conclusions concerning Luke's authority to bind 
Prowswood. It found no actual, express, inherent, or implied 
authority. 
As pointed out above, the authority to enter into an 
agreement to purchase real property can never be merely 
apparent, since it must be evidenced by a writing. But even 
if that were not the case, the trial court's conclusion of 
-law that Luke had apparent authority misreads the law of 
apparent authority. 
City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 
89 (Utah 1983) is the leading Utah case on the subject of 
apparent authority. There, an officer of Dean Evans 
Chrysler-Plymouth instructed a car salesman to make a 
purchase from City Electric and have it billed to Dean Evans. 
The salesman placed the order, informed City Electric that he 
was acting on the officer's directions, and instructed City 
Electric to charge Dean Evans' account. The issue treated on 
appeal was whether the salesman was clothed with apparent 
authority. The Utah Supreme Court held that he was not. The 
Court stated: 
It is well settled law that the apparent or 
ostensible authority of an agent can be inferred 
only from the acts and conduct of the principal. 
Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of Pres. of Ch. . 
etc. , Utah, 534 P.2d 887 (1975). . . . It follows 
that one who deals exclusively with an agent has 
the responsibility to ascertain that agent's 
authority despite the agent's representations. 
Bradshaw v. McBride, Utah 649 P.2d 74 (1982). 
Id. at 90. Accord, Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 27 
(1957). See also. Malia v. Giles. 114 P.2d 208 (Utah 1941); 
Larson v. Bear. 230 P.2d 610 (Wash. 1951). 
In the instant case, Mr. Nielson testified that he asked 
Luke if she had authority to sign the Agreement and that she 
assured them that she did. The Nielsons signed the Agreement 
-solely on the strength of this representation of Luke. 
Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Nielson ever testified that they 
inferred her authority from the acts or conduct of Prowswood. 
In fact, Mr. Nielson testified emphatically and repeatedly 
that despite his concern about whether or not Luke had 
authority to bind Prowswood to the Agreement, he did not 
inquire of anyone at Prowswood, including his own son-in-law, 
as to Luke's authority to execute the Agreement. Trial 
Transcript. Vol. 1. pp. 105-07. 
The fact that Prowswood provided Luke with business 
cards and letterhead is wholly irrelevant to this issue. 
First of all, there was no testimony that a real estate 
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agent's letterhead or business card creates any implication 
that the agent has authority to bind the brokerage to 
purchase a property. Second, there was no testimony that the 
Nielsons ever saw either her letterhead or her business card. 
Third, the Nielsons never testified that they relied on her 
letterhead or business card in concluding she had authority 
to bind Prowswood. 
Furthermore, as a matter of law, promotional materials 
without more do not create apparent authority. The Utah 
Supreme Court so ruled in State v. GAF Corp. , 760 P.2d 310 
(Utah 1988). There, the State Department of Consumer 
Protection sought to enforce against GAF a warranty made by 
one of its retailers, relying upon promotional materials 
^supplied by GAF to retailers as a basis for finding apparent 
authority. After quoting the passage from City Electric 
excerpted above, the Court held that: 
Merely providing promotional materials to Pendleton 
[the retailer] is not sufficient to establish GAF's 
liability for Pendleton's statements on a theory of 
apparent authority. 
760 P.2d at 314. For purposes of this analysis, Rita Luke's 
letterhead and business cards and this retailer's GAF 
promotional materials are indistinguishable. Both suggest an 
affiliation with a principal; neither creates apparent 
authority. 
In sum, the record here is devoid of any evidence that 
the Nielsons inferred from Prowswood1s acts or conduct that 
Luke was authorized to bind Prowswood. For this Court to 
affirm a finding of apparent authority on this state of the 
record would throw the law of apparent authority into a state 
of disarray. 
3. 
PROWSWOOD DID NOT RATIFY THE AGREEMENT WITH THE NIELSONS 
BY ACCEPTING A REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FROM THE KOCHES 
The trial court found as a matter of fact and a matter 
of law that Prowswood ratified the Luke Agreement. Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 12. This conclusion 
rests, apparently, on the findings that Prowswood received a 
sales commission (Finding No. 45) and that it "has retained 
its commission and has not returned the commission to Rita 
Luke." Finding No. 46. It is unclear what the court meant 
by "returning" the commission to Rita Luke, since Prowswood 
did not receive the commission from her. The commission was 
paid by the Koches, sellers of the property to the Nielsons. 
For at least three reasons, Prowswood did not ratify 
Luke's execution of the Agreement by accepting and retaining 
a sales commission. 
A. Prowswood Lacked Both Knowledge and Intent to 
Ratify 
In Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982), the 
Utah Supreme Court explained that to ratify an agent's acts, 
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a principal must have both knowledge of the material facts 
and an intent to ratify: 
A principal may impliedly or expressly ratify an 
agreement made by an unauthorized agent. Ratifica-
tion of an agent's acts relates back to the time 
the unauthorized act occurred and is sufficient to 
create the relationship of principal and agent. 
[Citations omitted.] . . . However, a ratification 
requires the principal to have knowledge of all 
material facts and an intent to ratify. 
Id. at 78 (emphasis added). Both knowledge and intent are 
necessary. 
Prowswood was unaware of the Luke Agreement when it 
accepted the commission from Mr. and Mrs. Koch on the sale of 
the property. That is undisputed. Since Prowswood lacked 
"knowledge of all material facts," it could not have ratified 
the Luke Agreement at that time. 
But did Prowswood ratify the Agreement by retaining the 
commission after learning the material facts? Clearly not. 
Prowswood learned of the of the existence of the Agreement 
and the Nielsons1 reliance upon it through the Nielsons1 
letter dated May 10, 1989. By letter dated June 10, 1986, 
Prowswood notified the Nielsons that the authority to bind 
Prowswood to purchase the property "was far in excess" of 
Luke's authority as a sales agent. In other words, it 
repudiated the Agreement. Clearly, it did not manifest an 
intent to ratify. 
Since Prowswood lacked both knowledge and intent, it did 
not ratify the Luke Agreement at any time. 
B. Any Ratification Had to Be in Writing 
Further in Bradshaw v. McBride, the Court held: 
Where the law requires the authority to be given in 
writing, the ratification must also generally be in 
writing. [Citations omitted.] 
649 P. 2d at 79. As noted above, Utah law requires that an 
agent executing an agreement to purchase real property must 
be authorized in writing. Therefore, the principal's 
ratification of the agent's acts must also be in writing. 
The trial court found no such writing. No such writing 
exists. 
Nor may Prowswood's retention of the commission be 
deemed a part performance sufficient to take the case outside 
±he statute of frauds, since "the acts of part performance 
must be exclusively referable to the contract." Id. In this 
case, retaining the commission was not "exclusively refera-
ble" to the Luke Agreement. In fact, the Luke Agreement does 
not even mention a commission; the commission is provided for 
in the listing agreement between Prowswood and the Koches, as 
discussed below. 
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C. Prowswood Did Not Ratify the Luke Agreement By 
Accepting a Commission Under the Listing Agreement 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 98, specifical-
ly addresses when receipt of a benefit may be construed as an 
affirmance or ratification. That section states in pertinent 
part: 
The receipt by a purported principal . . . of 
something to which he would not be entitled unless 
an act purported to be done for him were affirmed, 
and to which he makes no claim except through such 
act, constitutes an affirmance . . . 
Prowswood's commission was not "something to which [it] would 
not be entitled" absent affirmance, nor did Prowswood claim 
its commission through the Luke Agreement. Prowswood was 
entitled to its commission through a different agreement 
altogether: the Koch listing agreement. When it fulfilled 
the conditions of the listing agreement, Prowswood became 
legally entitled to receive a sales commission from Mr. and 
Mrs. Koch, irrespective of the enforceability of the Luke 
Agreement. Therefore, acceptance of the commission cannot be 
construed as ratification of the Luke Agreement. 
Implicit in the trial court's finding that Prowswood did 
not "return" its commission to Luke is the suggestion that 
doing so would have had the effect of repudiating the Luke 
Agreement. That suggestion does not withstand analysis. 
Since Prowswood did not claim the commission though the Luke 
Agreement, returning the commission could not have had the 
effect of repudiating the Luke Agreement. Although Mr. 
Nielson made much of the fact that he would not have pur-
chased the property without the Luke Agreement, the two 
agreements were legally independent. 
4. 
EVIDENCE OF MARIUS NIELSON!S EXPERIENCE AS A 
LICENSED REAL ESTATE BROKER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED 
Marius Nielson holds brokerage licenses in Utah and 
California. At times these licenses have been active, at 
other times inactive. He had two companies, one called J. 
Marius Nielson Real Estate Company, another called J. Marius 
Nielson Associates. Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 139. 
On cross-examination, Prowswood's counsel attempted to 
-elicit from Mr. Nielson testimony regarding his experience as 
a broker in these real estate companies, and specifically his 
understanding of a real estate agent1s authority to bind his 
or her broker. Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 140. Also 
relevant to the action would have been Mr. Nielson1s experi-
ence, if any, with guaranteed buy-back programs. However, 
the trial court sustained an objection based on relevance, 
thereby preventing counsel from exploring these issues with 
Mr. Nielson. Id. 
The testimony sought from Mr. Nielson was clearly 
relevant to the issue of apparent authority. In Associated 
Creditors1 Agency v. Davis, 530 P.2d 1084, 1100 (Cal. 1975), 
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the California Supreme Court stated the requirements for a 
finding of apparent authority as follows: 
It is elementary that there are three requirements 
necessary before recovery may be had against a 
principal for the act of an ostensible agent. The 
person dealing with he agent must do so with belief 
in the agent's authority and this belief must be a 
reasonable one; such belief must be generated by 
some act or neglect of the principal sought to be 
charged; and the third person reiving on the 
agent's apparent authority must not be guilty of 
negligence. [Emphasis added, citations omitted.] 
Mr. Nielson testified that he relied upon Rita Luke's 
assurances that she had authority to execute the Agreement 
for Prowswood. In accepting her representations without 
further independent investigation, Mr. Nielson acted negli-
gently. Mr. Nielson's knowledge and experience with real 
estate agents and their authority heightened his duty to 
inquire of Prowswood as to Luke's authority and were there-
fore relevant to his negligence. 
Similarly, if his testimony had shown that he did not 
offer guaranteed buy-back programs or that he was largely 
unfamiliar with them, those facts would have indicated an 
even greater degree of negligence on his part in relying upon 
Luke's representations. 
His testimony would therefore have been relevant. Rule 
402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence establishes the admis-
sibility of relevant evidence absent countervailing 
considerations: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the 
United States or the Constitution of the state of 
Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state, • . . 
Because counsel's questioning was designed to elicit relevant 
and therefore admissible testimony, it was error to exclude 
it on the ground of relevancy or on any other. 
5. 
THE REASONABLE RENTAL VALUE OF THE PROPERTY 
SHOULD OFFSET THE NIELSONS• JUDGMENT 
On May 10, 1986, the Nielsons gave notice of their 
election, pursuant to their understanding of the Luke 
Agreement, to have Prowswood sell or purchase the property. 
~On their view, Prowswood anticipatorily breached the Agree-
ment in June of 1986. They seek prejudgment interest from 
that time. 
At trial, all parties agreed that Prowswood and Luke 
were entitled to offset against the judgment entered against 
them the fair rental value of the property from the date of 
alleged breach through trial. The Nielsons state in their 
Amended Trial Brief, "Because the Nielsons lived in the home, 
Prowswood is entitled to an offset for the fair rental value 
of the property together with a deed." Plaintiffs' Amended 
Trial Memorandum, p. 15. Furthermore, the Nielsons1 counsel 
stated at trial that "under the doctrine of equity [Defen-
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dants] are entitled to an offset of fair rental value." 
Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 83. See also. Id. at p. 7. This 
is a correct statement of the law. See Eliason v. Watts, 615 
P.2d 427 (Utah 1980). 
However, the trial court failed to award an offset in 
any amount. Even if the balance of the trial court's 
judgment is affirmed, the case should be remanded for entry 
of an offset in favor of Prowswood and Luke. 
According to the expert testimony of Gene C. Jorgensen, 
the fair market rental value of the property was between 
$900.00 and $1,000.00 per month for each month during the 
period 1986 through the date of trial. Prowswood and Luke 
are therefore entitled to an offset against the Nielsons1 
judgment of between $19,800 ($900.00 X 22 months) and 
$22,000.00 ($1,000.00 X 22 months). 
6. 
IF THE NIELSONS1 JUDGMENT AGAINST PROWSWOOD IS AFFIRMED, 
PROWSWOOD IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT OVER AGAINST LUKE 
Prowswood strenuously denies that Rita Luke had apparent 
authority to bind Prowswood to the Agreement or that Prows-
wood ratified her execution of the Agreement. But if 
Prowswood is ultimately found to have granted her apparent 
authority, it is entitled to indemnification from Luke for 
breach of her Independent Contractor Agreement. Prowswood 
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pled this cross-claim, briefed it, and argued it at trial, 
but the trial court did not rule on it. The Court of Appeals 
should grant Prowswood"s cross-claim against Luke as a matter 
of law. 
As stated in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner 
Insurance Agency, 96 Idaho 691, 535 P.2d 664, 670 (Idaho 
1975), 
It is well established in agency law that a 
principal has judicial recourse against an agent 
who subjects his principal to liability because of 
a wrongful act beyond the agent's authority. 
Accord, Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 401, Comment d. 
Among the principal's remedies in this situation is an action 
on the agent's contract. Restatement (Second) of Agency, 
Sec. 399(a). 
Luke lacked authority to bind Prowswood to purchase the 
property. Paragraph 9 of her Independent Contractor Agree-
ment expressly withholds the authority "to incur any expense, 
enter any contract, or make any representation or commitment 
for and on behalf of [Prowswood] unless such authority is 
specifically given, in writing, with respect to each such 
transaction." Luke herself specifically testified that she 
lacked authority to execute a purchase agreement on behalf of 
Prowswood. 
Indisputably, Luke breached her Independent Contractor 
Agreement by executing the Agreement on Prowswoodfs behalf. 
As a result of her breach, Prowswood may suffer damages in 
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the form of the judgment entered against it in this matter. 
If the judgment against Prowswood is upheld on appeal, 
Prowswood is as a matter of law entitled to contract damages 
from Luke for her breach of Independent Contractor Agreement, 
since Prowswood's liability will flow directly from that 
breach. Prowswood's damages would consist of the amounts it 
is required to pay the Nielsons plus its attorney's fees 
incurred in defending against this action. 
Prowswood can discover no basis, given the lack of 
knowledge, intent, a writing, or any ratifying act, for this 
Court to affirm the trial court's finding of ratification. 
However, Prowswood concedes that ratification would bar its 
claim against Luke, since ratification releases the agent 
-from liability to the principal for unauthorized acts. 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 416. 
A different rule governs apparent authority. Again, 
Prowswood can discover no basis, given Mr. Nielson's testi-
mony that he relied exclusively on Luke's own representations 
of authority, for this Court to affirm the trial court's 
finding of apparent authority. However, a finding of 
apparent authority would not impair Prowswood's cross-claim 
against Luke. Unlike ratification, apparent authority is not 
a defense against a principal's indemnification claim, See 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Sec. 399 et seq. And at 
least one court has specifically opined that where a princi-
pal is held liable to a third party on an apparent authority 
theory, the principal may seek indemnification from the 
agency for exceeding its actual authority. Stuart v. 
National Indemnity Co., 7 Ohio App.3d 63, 454 N.E.2d 158, 165 
(Ct.App. Ohio 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental issues on this appeal are simple. Did 
Rita Luke have authority to bind Prowswood to purchase real 
property? If not, did Prowswood later ratify her acts? 
Clearly, under well settled statutory and case law, the 
answer to both questions must be "no." Therefore, the 
judgment below must be reversed. 
If the Court affirms the judgment below, it should at 
least award Prowswood the offset all parties agree it is 
entitled to, and direct that judgment be entered against Rita 
Luke and in favor of Prowswood for breach of the Independent 
Contractor Agreement. _ 
DATED: May ]__/_, 1989 
POOLE & SMITH 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann, Section 25-5-1 (1953) 
Utah Code Ann, Section 25-5-3 (1953) 
Utah Code Ann, Section 25-5-4 (1953) 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 27 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 98 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 399 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 401 (with comments) 
Luke/Nielson Agreement 
May 10, 1986 Letter from the Nielsons to Prowswood 
June 10, 1986 Letter from Richard Prows to the Nielsons 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or 
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surren-
dered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto autho-
rized by writing. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the 
sale, of any lands, or any interest m lands, shall be void unless the contract, or 
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto autho-
rized in writing. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless wri t ten and sub-
scribed. 
In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is m writmg subscribed by the party to 
be charged therewith 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one 
year from the making thereot 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of 
another 
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration 
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry 
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to 
answer m damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or 
intestate out of his own estate 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for compensation. 
§ 2 7 , Creation of Apparent Authority: General Rule 
Except for the execution of instruments under seal or 
for the conduct of transactions required by statute to 
be authorized in a particular way, apparent authority 
to do an act is created as to a third person by written 
or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal 
which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person 
to believe that the principal consents to have the act 
done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for 
him. 
§ 9 8 . Receipt of Benefits as Affirmance 
The receipt by a purported principal, with knowledge of 
the facts, of something to which he would not be en-
titled unless an act purported to be done for him were 
affirmed, and to which he makes no claim except 
through such act, constitutes an affirmance unless at 
the time of such receipt he repudiates the act. If he 
repudiates the act, his receipt of benefits constitutes an 
affirmance at the election of the other party to the 
transaction. 
§ 3 9 9 . Remedies of Principal 
A principal whose agent has violated or threatens to 
violate his duties has an appropriate remedy for such 
violation. Such remedy may be: 
{%) an action on the contract of service; 
(b) an action for losses and for the misuse of prop-
erty; 
(c) an action in equity to enforce the provisions of an 
express trust undertaken by the agent; 
(d) an action for restitution, either at law or in 
equity; 
(e) an action for an accounting; 
(f) an action for an injunction; 
(g) set-off or counterclaim; 
(h) causing the agent to be made party to an action 
brought by a third person against the principal; 
(i) self-help; 
(j) discharge; or 
(k) refusal to pay compensation or rescission of the 
contract of employment. 
§ 4 0 1 • Liability for Loss Caused 
An agent is subject to liability for loss caused to the 
principal by any breach of duty. 
Comment; 
a. Action of tort or on the contract of employment. The 
relation between principal and agent is always consensual but not 
always contractual. See § 16. A failure to perform a gratuitous 
promise when there has been loss because of reliance by the prin-
cipal may cause the agent to be liable only in an action 01 1011. 
See § 378. On the other hand, if the sole basis for an action is a 
promise by the agent to act, as when the agent agrees to repre-
sent the principal for a year and fails to do so, there being no 
element of reliance by the principal, the latter has only an action 
for breach of contract. But if a paid agent does something wrong-
ful, either knowing it to be wrong, or acting negligently, the prin-
cipal may have either an action of tort or an action of contract. 
This is true when an agent negligently harms a chattel of the 
principal, or, by negligence or fraud, causes a principal to be li-
able to a third person, exceeds his authority in selling goods, or 
violates a duty of loyalty. This choice of remedy may be im-
portant for procedural reasons, or because of a difference be-
tween the statute of limitations for torts and for contracts. 
Comment: 
b. Where no damages. A failure of the agent to perform 
his duties which results in no loss to the principal may subject 
the agent to liability for nominal damages for breach of contract, 
under the rule stated in Section 400, to liability for any profits he 
has thereby made (see § 403), to discharge (see § 409), or to loss 
of compensation (see § 469), but not to an action of tort. 
Illustration: 
1. A, the clerk of P, a contractor, being instructed to 
compute the cost of erecting a building and to submit a bid 
for its construction at 20 per cent, above cost, carelessly com-
putes the cost to be $45,000, and so submits a bid for $54,000, 
which is successful. A careful computation would have 
shown the cost to be $50,000 which would have resulted in a 
bid of $60,000 and would not have obtained the contract. 
The performance of the contract does not interfere with oth-
er work by P, and his profit is $4,000. A is not liable to P in 
an action of tort, but is subject to discharge. 
Comment: 
c. Gratuitous agents. If an agent has custody or posses-
sion of land or chattels, he is subject to the liability to which any 
bailee is subject, both as to damage which he causes and for fail-
ure properly to guard them from harm. If his services are gra-
tuitous, he is subject to the duties of care of gratuitous bailees or 
those gratuitously in charge of land. See § 379 (2). 
See Appendix for Reporter 's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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On the other hand, the mere failure of performance by a gra-
tuitous agent who does not have possession or custody of some-
thing which it is his duty to protect results in liability only under 
the circumstances stated in Section 378. His liability in tort is 
limited to the damage caused by reliance. Thus, if the principal 
had no other means of averting a loss or making a profit except 
through performance by the agent, a promise by the agent fol-
lowed by his nonperformance does not result in liability in tort. 
If, however, the principal has relied upon the promise and, but for 
such reliance, would have procured another who would have per-
formed the service, the gratuitous promisor, as well as the paid 
agent, is subject to liability in tort for the loss suffered by the 
failure, including gains which the principal would have made had 
the promise been performed. Compare the Restatement of Torts, 
§§ 323, 324. 
Illustrations: 
2. P, an insurance broker, tells his friend, A, that he 
would go fishing if he could find someone to attend to his 
business. A volunteers to do this gratuitously and goes to 
P's office. Shortly after, however, he leaves and as a result 
P loses several profitable transactions. A is liable to P for 
the loss. 
3. Having purchased a house, P asks his friend A for 
the name of a good insurance agent. A thereupon volunteers 
to obtain insurance in the amount of $20,000 on the house 
immediately and without charge for his services. P author-
izes A to do this. A obtains a blank application but delays 
in getting the insurance. A week later the house burns. P 
is entitled to damages caused by A's promise and P's reliance 
upon it. 
4. A promises P that he will buy at auction a piece of 
land for P, without charge for his services, P stating truth-
fully that, unless A acts for him, he will have no way of mak-
ing the bid. A attends the auction but does not make the 
promised bid, which would have been successful had it been 
made. A is not liable to P. 
Comment: 
d. Subjecting 'principal to suit by third persons. Unless he 
has been authorized to act in the manner in which he acts, the 
agent who subjects his principal to liability because of a negli-
gent or other wrongful act is subject to liability to the principal 
for the loss which results therefrom. This includes the payment 
of damages by the principal to the third person, or of a fine to the 
state in case of a crime. Thus, a servant who, while acting with-
in the scope of employment, negligently injures a third person, 
although personally liable to such person, is also subject to lia-
bility to the principal if the principal is thereby required to pay 
damages. See the Restatement of Restitution, § 96. If suit is 
brought against a principal alone, the principal, under the pro-
visions of some modern statutes, can cause the agent to be made 
a party, or he can notify the agent to defend the suit with the 
consequences stated in Comment h on Section 399. 
If the principal authorizes a tort, either advertently or inad-
vertently, he cannot recover for harm resulting to him from it. 
Hence, if the principal directs the agent to do an act which, to the 
knowledge of the agent, is either tortious or criminal, the agent 
is subject to no liability to the principal, unless he should realize 
that the principal is mistaken and believes the act to be a lawful 
one, in which case the agent would not be authorized to perform 
i t 
Where the negligence of both principal and agent combine in 
causing loss to a third person, the principal has a right to con-
tribution in states in which this is permitted between tortfeasors. 
Under some circumstances, although both are negligent, the prin-
cipal may have a right to indemnity. For statements as to the 
situations in which this may be true, see the Restatement of Res-
titution, Sections 93, 95 and 97. 
e. Damage caused by disobedience. If an agent acts con-
trary to the principal's orders or if he fails to act as directed in 
the control of the principal's things, and a loss to the principal re-
sults from such disobedience or failure to act, the agent is subject 
to liability for such loss if the loss is within the risk created by 
the disobedience, even though the risk of loss is less than it would 
have been had the principal's directions been followed. If the dis-
obedience consists of wrongfully dealing with chattels, the agent 
may be liable for their full value, although the risk of loss was not 
increased by the disobedience. See § 402. 
Illustrations: 
5. P directs A, his collecting agent, to extend the time 
for payment by a debtor, T. A, reasonably believing that his 
See Appendix for Reporter 's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
principal's judgment is erroneous and that a present attach-
ment on T's goods will more readily secure the collection of 
the debt, levies an attachment. Because of this, T files a pe-
tition in bankruptcy, and P secures only a portion of his 
claim. A is subject to liability to P upon proof that, but for 
A's disobedience, a larger amount upon the claim would prob-
ably have been received. 
6. P tells A to lend T S4,000, taking as security a first 
mortgage on Blackacre, which is reasonably worth $10,000. 
A lends T the money, taking a second mortgage as security. 
Upon T's bankruptcy without assets, both mortgages are 
foreclosed. Blackacre sells for its present value of $4,000, of 
which $1,000 is used for payment of the first mortgage and 
expenses of sale. A is subject to liability to P for $1,000. 
Comment: 
/. The liability of the agent is limited by the rules as to con-
tributory negligence and avoidable consequences where those 
rules are applicable. See § 415. 
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1535 Eas t 6470 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 34121 
llay 10, 1936 
Mr. S c o t t Dean 
Broker 
Prowswood Real cor 
4385 South 900 E a s t 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 34117 
Dear Mr. Dean: 
We enclo8e copy of Agreement dated 11/29/35 wherein Rita Luke, acting 
aa an agent of Prowswood Realtor, commits, under prescribed conditions, 
to either sell or purchase our condominium, located at above addresa, 
at a price that will generate net funds to us the sua of $160,000. 
In keeping with the terms of the Agreement, we hereby give formal 
notice that we have elected to exercise referenced option and will 
look forward to receiving the proceeds of sale or purchase, totalling 
$160,000, on or before September 10, 1986. 
We solicit your cooperation to this end. 
Sincerely, 
J. Marius Nielson 
Faye K# Nielson 
EXHIBIT "E" 
V 
June 10, 1986 
J. Marius and Faye K. Nielson 
1585 East 6470 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Dear Marius and Faye; 
In the last several weeks, and more particularly, in the last day 
or two I have been reviewing the "agreement" which you drafted on 
the 29th of November, 1985 and which was signed by Rita Luke* 
Also, I have reviewed carefully the subsequent communications that 
have been shared between yourself and Scott Dean representing 
Prowswood Realtor. 
Rita and I have reviewed her understanding of this "agreement1* . I 
can appreciate the consternation that has obviously resulted for 
everyone in coming to a successful and satisfactory resolution. 
The "agreement" makes reference to Prowswood m^ving a guarantee 
'for "repurchase". Of course, other than the fact that Prowswood, 
Ltd. was the original builder, we have never owned the property 
and therefore the word "repurchase" adds to the ambiguities 
therein. 
Rita has been a successful real estate agent for our firm for 
over 11 years. We have never had a moment's hesitation about her 
representations nor uhe contract negotiations in which she has 
been involved. Additionally, because of her reputation and the 
confidence we have in her, we have given her the latitude to waive 
receipt of commissions both for herself and for us as a brokerage 
when she feels that circumstances justify such an action. This 
current "agreement" is reflective of that type of commitment. 
Our current reputation for honesty and clarity is being tested by 
this situation. Because you are valuable friends we have a 
special interest in seeing that your feelings and expectations are 
delicately dealt with. In light of this, we feel that it is a 
reasonable compromise that Rita, as the sub-agent for me, be 
permitted to immediately begin a marketing program of your 
property to affect a desired sale. In keeping with our original 
understanding of the "agreement", we will bear expenses relative 
to marketing your home and, of course, endeavor to net you the 
$160,000.00 mentioned in the November 29th "agreement"... even .f 
it is necessary for us to forgo all commissions to accomplish tha-
end. 
Prowswood. Ltd. • 4885 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84117 • Telephone (COD 262-4637 
My involvement is tc reaffirm our united stand and our deepest 
commitment to do all in our power to fulfill what we feel is our 
obligation under this "agreement". 
As a licensed Utah broker yourself, familiar with real estate law 
and practices, and even more importantly, as one who was at one 
time employed by this company, it surely must have occurred to you 
that the commitment you felt Rita was making when she signed the 
"agreement" you prepared^^=wa^-^far in exCess of the authority 
granted to her as an, independent agent in behalf of the Company. 
I hope this matter can be ""resolved to a mutually satisfying 
conclusion. My best to your wife. 
Warm personal regards, 
(/^ Lfc < < 
Richard S.Prows, Chairman 
Prowswood, Ltd. 
cc: Rita Luke 
Scott Dean 
Reed Harding 
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